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The Civil War was the greatest constitutional crisis in the history of 
the United States.  It is both common wisdom and correct wisdom that 
the Union might not have been preserved had a person with lesser 
qualities than those of Abraham Lincoln been president.  So it is natural 
that constitutional scholars and historians have analyzed Lincoln and 
the Constitution for the lessons that we can learn from his exercise of 
power and to discern the impact that he had on our understanding of the 
Constitution itself and the nature of the government that it establishes. 
 
The focus of the analyses has varied.  Most evaluations of Lincoln 
and the Constitution deal with the way he exercised presidential power 
to preserve the Union—in particular, whether his actions suggest that, in 
times of great crisis, a president may transgress legal and constitutional 
limits in order to fulfill his constitutional obligation to preserve, protect, 
and defend the Constitution.1
 
* Professor Emeritus of History, The Ohio State University. 
  Others discuss Lincoln’s view of the 
1. The classic statement of the idea that Lincoln exercised dictatorial powers in the Civil 
War crisis is CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT 
IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1948).  This is a common view among political scientists 
and formerly among lawyers.  It is reflected in textbooks on the presidency, such as JAMES W. 
DAVIS, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 24 (2d ed. 1995); LOUIS W. KOENIG, THE CHIEF 
EXECUTIVE 6 (6th ed. 1996); and RICHARD M. PIOUS, THE PRESIDENCY 81–83 (1996).  See 
also GOTTFRIED DIETZE, AMERICA’S POLITICAL DILEMMA: FROM LIMITED TO 
UNLIMITED DEMOCRACY 17–62 (1968); SCOTT M. MATHESON, JR., PRESIDENTIAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN PERILOUS TIMES 33–51 (2009).  Although admiring Lincoln’s 
character and restraint, Arthur M. Schlesinger described Lincoln’s actions as extra-
constitutional, in ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 58–67 (1989), 
and even referred to him as a “despot.”  Id. at 59.  See also James G. Randall, Lincoln in the 
Role of Dictator, 28 S. ATLANTIC Q. 236, 237 (1929).  However, most historians have tended 
to stress Lincoln’s strong commitment to constitutionalism.  See HERMAN J. BELZ, Lincoln 
and the Constitution: The Dictatorship Question Reconsidered, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND EQUAL RIGHTS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 17–43 (1998); Michael 
Les Benedict, “The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions”: Lincoln, the Powers of the 
Commander in Chief, and the Constitution, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 927, 929–30 (2008); DON E. 
FEHRENBACHER, Lincoln and the Constitution, in LINCOLN: IN TEXT AND CONTEXT 113–28 
(1987); Phillip Shaw Paludan, “Dictator Lincoln”: Surveying Lincoln and the Constitution, 21 
ORG. AM. HISTORIANS MAG. HIST. 8, 8–12 (2007).  Legal academic Daniel Farber has 
commented similarly in DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 196–200 (2003).   
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Union, how he articulated a vision of a more organic nation than what 
had been the dominant view of a federation of sovereign states.2  And 
yet others reflect upon Lincoln’s changing understanding of African 
Americans as members of the American community with the rights of 
citizens.3
I.  LINCOLN, DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
This Article will address a subject present in such discussions but 
rarely made explicit: constitutional politics.  Lincoln was not speaking to 
constitutional historians and law professors, nor writing for them.  He 
was engaged in a terrific political struggle over the meaning of the 
Constitution and its limitations.  The issues were not going to be decided 
by the courts; they were going to be decided by the American people.  
Despite his early preferences, Lincoln did not perceive judges to be the 
chief guardians of the Constitution, nor the primary arbiters of its 
meaning.  Like nearly all Americans of his time, Lincoln assumed that 
profound constitutional issues would be decided through the political 
process—a process of constitutional politics. 
Nothing in Lincoln’s early experience would have led him to think 
otherwise.  The young Lincoln had been an avid Whig.  His hero was 
Henry Clay, the author of the “American System” for federal-
government development of a general system of transportation and 
communications.  He made “internal improvements” the cornerstone of 
his first run for the state legislature at the age of twenty-three, and he 
continued to advocate them after their popularity waned.  He defended 
the constitutionality and expediency of internal improvements in one of 
only three major speeches that he delivered during his single term in 
Congress, defending a system like the one that Clay proposed, after the 
Democratic national platform denounced it as unconstitutional.  He 
advocated a protective tariff and a national bank.4
 
2. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: HOW LINCOLN 
REDEFINED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 67–68 (2001); GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT 
GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 121–47 (1992).  
 
3. See, e.g., DON E. FEHRENBACHER, Only His Stepchildren, in FEHRENBACHER, supra 
note 1, at 95–112.  See generally BENJAMIN QUARLES, LINCOLN AND THE NEGRO (1962); 
LAWANDA COX, LINCOLN AND BLACK FREEDOM: A STUDY IN PRESIDENTIAL 
LEADERSHIP (1981); LERONE BENNETT JR., FORCED INTO GLORY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN’S 
WHITE DREAM (2000).   
4. See BRIAN DIRCK, LINCOLN THE LAWYER 83–85 (2007); Mark E. Neely, Jr., Lincoln 
and the Constitution, in THE BEST AMERICAN HISTORY ESSAYS ON LINCOLN 229, 229–33 
(Sean Wilentz ed., 2009); MARK E. STEINER, AN HONEST CALLING: THE LAW PRACTICE OF 
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To be sure, Lincoln’s general advocacy of a broad construction of 
federal power to enact such legislation was sustained by decisions of the 
Supreme Court under John Marshall—especially, of course, by 
McCulloch v. Maryland,5 which explicitly upheld the constitutionality of 
a national bank, and Gibbons v. Ogden,6 which broadly defined federal 
power over interstate commerce.  Lincoln cited such decisions to 
support his arguments in favor of active government.  For example, in 
an 1839 speech attacking the Democratic plan to establish a sub-treasury 
system to hold federal funds, Lincoln defended Congress’s 
constitutional power to charter a national bank as an alternative.  He 
cited the actions of the first Congress, which included many of the 
Constitution’s framers, who “decided upon their oaths that such a bank 
is constitutional.”7  He pointed out that the votes of Congress more 
often sustained than challenged the bank’s constitutionality.  “In 
addition to all this we have shown that the Supreme Court . . . has 
solemnly decided that such a bank is constitutional.”8  That Court, he 
added, was “the tribunal which the Constitution has itself established to 
decide Constitutional questions.”9
Despite Whig legal learning, despite decisions of the Supreme Court, 
Jacksonian Democrats had gained and kept power by advocating state 
rights and strict construction of federal power under the Constitution.  
They had killed the national bank, eliminated protective tariffs, and 
repudiated a general system of internal improvements.  Citing Supreme 
Court opinions might strengthen a constitutional argument made to the 
  But he had known better than to rely 
on its decision alone.  
 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 56 (2006).  See generally GABOR BORITT, LINCOLN AND THE 
ECONOMICS OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 1–152 (1978); ALLEN C. GUELZO, ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN: REDEEMER PRESIDENT 26–184 (1999).  For Lincoln’s campaign notice endorsing 
internal improvements, see Abraham Lincoln, Communication to the People of Sangamo 
County, SANGAMO J. (Ill.), Mar. 15, 1832, reprinted in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 5, 5 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953) [hereinafter COLLECTED WORKS].  
For his congressional speech on internal improvements, see Abraham Lincoln, Speech in 
United States House of Representatives on Internal Improvements, ILL. J., July 20, 1848, 
reprinted in 1 COLLECTED WORKS, supra, at 480; for his advocacy of a national bank, see 
Abraham Lincoln, Speech on the Sub-Treasury, SANGAMO J. (Ill.), Mar. 6, 1840, reprinted in 
1 COLLECTED WORKS, supra, at 159; for his thoughts on the tariff, see Abraham Lincoln, 
Fragments of a Tariff Discussion (possibly Dec. 1, 1847), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS, supra, at 
407. 
5. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
6. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
7. Lincoln, Speech on the Sub-Treasury, supra note 4, at 170. 
8. Id. at 170–71. 
9. Id. at 171. 
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public, but Lincoln knew from experience that it did not necessarily 
win it. 
Lincoln distrusted what he saw as Democrats’ impatience with legal 
constraints and formalities and their willingness to ride roughshod over 
vested rights.  Back in 1837, as a twenty-eight-year-old state 
representative, Lincoln had fought against a Democratic resolution to 
appoint a committee to investigate alleged frauds in the organization of 
the state bank.  This proposed investigation was designed to trump up 
grounds to revoke the bank’s charter and was completely without legal 
warrant, he insisted.  His admonition was directed “exclusively for the 
law-loving and law-abiding part of the House,” he declared.  “To those 
who claim omnipotence for the Legislature, and who in the plenitude of 
their assumed powers, are disposed to disregard the Constitution, law, 
good faith, moral right, and every thing else, I have not a word to say.”10
His words presaged the address, well known among Lincoln scholars 
and buffs, that he delivered a year later to the Young Men’s Lyceum of 
Springfield.  In it he worried about growing lawlessness in the United 
States, manifested in mobs that had lynched criminals, burned Mormon 
and Catholic churches, ravaged African-American neighborhoods, 
attacked abolitionists, and murdered an antislavery newspaper editor.  
The passions of the people were once the pillar supporting America’s 
free institutions but were now their enemy, he warned.  Those 
institutions would not survive if the trend towards extralegal violence 
continued.
 
11  In this address Lincoln did not specifically blame 
Democrats for encouraging such lawlessness by their own tendency to 
disregard procedure and rights and to pander to the masses.  Perhaps 
that would have been poor form given the occasion.  But in other 
political addresses he made clear that he thought that Jacksonian 
Democrats put liberty in jeopardy, and that freedom itself was at stake 
in the political conflicts of Jacksonian America.12  However, the issue 
was in the hands of the people.  “Many free countries have lost their 
liberty; and ours may lose hers,” he conceded.13
 
10. Abraham Lincoln, Speech in the Illinois Legislature Concerning the State Bank, 
SANGAMO J. (Ill.), Jan. 28, 1837, reprinted in 1 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 61, 67. 
  He could commit only 
11. Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois, 
SANGAMO J. (Ill.), Feb. 3, 1838, reprinted in 1 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 108, 108–
09. 
12. See, e.g., Lincoln, Speech on the Sub-Treasury, supra note 4, at 178–79.  Lincoln’s 
admonitions regarding the danger of popular passions and violence reflected a common Whig 
theme.  See STEINER, supra note 4, at 56–58. 
13. Lincoln, Speech on the Sub-Treasury, supra note 4, at 178.  
2010] LINCOLN AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 1337 
to fight with all his resolve.  “[I]f after all, we shall fail, be it so.  We still 
shall have the proud consolation of saying to our consciences, and to the 
departed shade of our country’s freedom, that . . . we never faultered.”14  
Likewise, in his Young Men’s Lyceum Address, Lincoln’s only solution 
to the dangers that passions and lawlessness posed for the republic was 
to persuade the people themselves to eschew passion for reason.  
Reason must “be moulded into general intelligence, sound morality and, 
in particular, a reverence for the constitution and laws,” he orated.15  
“Our government rests in public opinion,” he would later tell 
Republicans at a party banquet.  “Whoever can change public opinion, 
can change the government.”16
The antislavery struggle, which Lincoln joined relatively late, was 
from beginning to end a political battle against a proslavery 
constitutional regime that had been buttressed by the settled 
constitutional decisions of courts almost everywhere in the United 
States.  Judicial opinion was uniform that firm constitutional protection 
of slavery had been the price of union in 1787.  Consequently, federal 
courts—and until the mid-1850s state courts—had rebuffed virtually 
every attempt to restrain federal power in its support and defeated 
every state attempt to protect black inhabitants from slavery’s reach, 
with the one exception of a growing tendency to deny slaveholders the 
right temporarily to bring slaves into free states.
 
17  Antislavery lawyers 
developed an antislavery constitutionalism that they intended to make 
the law of the land, just as state-rights-oriented constitutionalism had 
triumphed with the rise of the Jacksonian Democrats three decades 
earlier.18
 
14. Id. at 179. 
  Republicans felt no more constrained by the Taney Court’s 
15. Lincoln, Address Before the Young Men’s Lyceum, supra note 11, at 115. 
16. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at a Republican Banquet, Chicago, Illinois, DEMOCRATIC 
PRESS (Chi.), Dec. 11, 1856, reprinted in 2 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 383, 385. 
17. See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS 159–259 (1975); MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 59–108 (1957); EARL M. MALTZ, SLAVERY 
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1825–1861 (2009); William M. Wiecek, Slavery and Abolition 
Before the United States Supreme Court, 1820–1860, 65 J. AM. HIST. 34 (1978). 
18. See generally GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: THE RISE AND FALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES (2007).  For mainstream 
antebellum antislavery constitutionalism, see generally WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES 
OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760–1848 (1977).  See also ERIC 
FONER, Salmon P. Chase: The Constitution and the Slave Power, in FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, 
FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 73–102 
(1970). 
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proslavery constitutionalism than Democrats had felt constrained by 
John Marshall’s constitutional nationalism.  The universal execration 
with which Republicans greeted the Court’s Dred Scott decision19 
reflected their conviction that the people, not the Court, had final 
authority to decide fundamental constitutional questions.20
Lincoln had more trouble than most Republicans in reconciling his 
recognition that the people in the end would determine the 
constitutional regime with his concern that passion would overcome 
reason in their deliberations.  As the late Phillip Shaw Paludan pointed 
out, Lincoln the Whig was not a democrat in the same way his 
Jacksonian opponents were.  He was not confident that popular 
judgments would always turn out right.  We have never found evidence 
that he really said that one could not fool all of the people all of the 
time—and even if he did say it, that is not much of an endorsement of 
democracy.
 
21  He had urged “a reverence for the constitution and laws” 
as an antidote to the danger of democratic passions.22  As Jay Ranney 
has pointed out in this symposium, Lincoln adhered to the tenets of 
“Whig lawyering,” which saw the legal system as a bulwark of order.    
When Democrats attacked antislavery Whig Henry W. Seward for 
avowing that people were obligated to obey a higher law than those 
made by men, Lincoln responded before even reading Seward’s speech 
that “in so far as it may attempt to foment a disobedience to the 
constitution, or to the constitutional laws of the country, it has my 
unqualified condemnation.”23
How did that “reverence for the constitution and laws” comport 
with disregarding the decision of the Supreme Court upon a point 
directly at issue?  The Democrats were arguing that Americans were 
obligated to accept the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott ruling.  Stephen A. 
Douglas, whom Lincoln was preparing to challenge for reelection to the 
U.S. Senate, insisted that when a Supreme Court decision “is 
 
 
19. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
20. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN 
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 417–48 (1978). 
21. Phillip Shaw Paludan, Lincoln and Democracy, in LINCOLN’S LEGACY: ETHICS AND 
POLITICS 1, 1–12 (Phillip Shaw Paludan ed., 2008). 
22. Lincoln, Address Before the Young Men’s Lyceum, supra note 11, at 115. 
23. Abraham Lincoln, Speech to the Springfield Scott Club, ILL. WKLY. J., Sept. 22, 1852, 
reprinted in 2 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 135, 156.  On “Whig lawyering,” see 
Joseph A. Ranney, In Praise of Whig Lawyering: A Commentary on Abraham Lincoln as 
Lawyer—and Politician, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2010). 
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pronounced, that decision becomes the law of the land,” and “every 
other good citizen, must bow to it, and yield obedience to it.”24
Fearful of democratic passions, Lincoln himself had often implied 
that a Supreme Court decision was dispositive of the law.
 
25  Given the 
Democratic record of disregarding the Marshall Court’s decisions, he 
was testy when Douglas accused him and other Republicans of violently 
resisting the Court’s ruling in the Dred Scott case.  “We believe, as much 
as Judge Douglas, (perhaps more) in obedience to, and respect for the 
judicial department of government,” he responded.  “We think its 
decisions on Constitutional questions, when fully settled, should 
control . . . the general policy of the country.”26  Indeed, he went on to 
say that resisting a Supreme Court decision in any way beyond 
proposing an amendment to the Constitution to reverse it “would be 
revolution.”27
In his debates with Douglas, Lincoln escaped his immediate 
dilemma by denying that the Dred Scott decision “fully settled” the 
issue.  Republicans would have acquiesced, he suggested, “[i]f this 
important decision had been made by the unanimous concurrence of the 
judges, and without any apparent partisan bias, and in accordance with 
legal public expectation, and with the steady practice of the departments 
throughout our history, and had been in no part, based on assumed 
historical facts which are not really true.”
 
28  This set a pretty high bar.  
However, he added that, even if these elements were lacking, the Court 
could set general constitutional policy if the question “had been before 
the court more than once, and had there been affirmed and re-affirmed 
through a course of years.”29
 
24. Stephen A. Douglas, The Issues of 1858 (July 16, 1858) (campaign speech delivered 
in Bloomington, Ill.), quoted in TIMOTHY S. GOOD, THE LINCOLN–DOUGLAS DEBATES AND 
THE MAKING OF A PRESIDENT 56 (2007). 
  This proposition went pretty far in 
conceding judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation.  Lincoln 
25. After his constitutional argument in defense of federal power to enact a program of 
internal improvements, see supra note 4 and accompanying text, he noted that “[t]his 
constitutional question will probably never be better settled than it is, until it shall pass under 
judicial consideration.”  Lincoln, Speech in United States House of Representatives on Internal 
Improvements, supra note 4, at 486.  As noted in the text associated with notes 7–9, supra, 
Lincoln was explicit in his speech on the sub-treasury about the Court’s having been charged 
with the responsibility for deciding constitutional questions. 
26. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois, ILL. ST. J., June 29, 1857, reprinted 
in 2 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 398, 401.  
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
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could not resist comparing Douglas’s newfound respect for Court 
decisions with what Jackson had said in disregarding the Marshall 
Court’s McCulloch decision: specifically, that each department of the 
government was free to act on its own interpretation of the Constitution.  
“Again and again have I heard Judge Douglas denounce that bank 
decision, and applaud Gen. Jackson for disregarding it.”30
At the same time, one can discern Lincoln’s ambivalence about the 
binding authority of Supreme Court decisions from the notes he 
prepared while sketching out his public position.  “What would be the 
effect” of accepting Douglas’s sudden deference to Court decisions, he 
mused, “if it should ever be the creed of a dominant party in the 
nation?”
 
31  It would mean that “‘[w]hatever decision the Supreme court 
makes on any constitutional question, must be obeyed, and enforced by 
all the departments of the federal government.’”32
Lincoln’s musings demonstrate the paradoxical relationship between 
the concept of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation and 
the reality of constitutional politics.  Judicial supremacy could take hold, 
he noted, only “if it should ever be the creed of a dominant party in the 
nation.”
  In his notes, Lincoln 
plainly thought the conclusion unacceptable, a position at odds with the 
more sympathetic account of judicial authority that he finally articulated 
in the debates. 
33  Lincoln made the connection between constitutional politics 
and decisions of the Supreme Court explicit in his first debate with 
Douglas.  Douglas and the Democratic party were conspiring to make 
slavery national.  How would they do it?  Through a Supreme Court 
decision that no state legislature could exclude slavery from a state, just 
as the Court had already decided that neither Congress nor the 
territorial legislatures could exclude it from a territory.34
But of course a Court decision alone could not accomplish the goal.  
“In this and like communities, public sentiment is everything.  With 
public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed.”
 
35
 
30. Id. at 402. 
  
One “who moulds public sentiment . . . makes statutes and decisions 
31. Abraham Lincoln, Fragment on the Dred Scott Case (possibly Jan. 1857), in 2 
COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 387, 387.  
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Abraham Lincoln, First Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Ottawa, Illinois, CHI. 
PRESS & TRIB., Aug. 21, 1858, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 1, 27. 
35. Id. 
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possible or impossible to be executed.”36  Lincoln argued that Douglas’s 
exaltation of the Supreme Court’s authority to interpret the 
Constitution was designed to mold public sentiment to facilitate the 
nationalization of slavery.  The idea was to persuade Northerners that 
the Supreme Court had the power to commit the American people to 
that policy, not because the decision was “right in itself . . . but because 
it has been decided by the court, and being decided by the court . . . you 
are bound to take it in your political action as law.”37  In terms we use 
now, Lincoln understood that judicial supremacy was politically 
constructed, and he was determined to prevent it.  He reiterated the 
point in speeches in following years.  Americans must prevent the 
nationalization of slavery “by either congresses or courts,” he insisted.38  
“The people—the people—are the rightful masters of both congresses, 
and courts—not to overthrow the constitution, but to overthrow the 
men who pervert it.”39
Lincoln finally abandoned his notion that the Supreme Court could 
bind everyone to its interpretation of the Constitution.  In his first 
inaugural address, he would say that Supreme Court decisions were 
binding on the parties involved, but they were only “entitled to very 
high respect and consideration, in all parallel cases, by all other 
departments of the government.”
 
40  “The candid citizen”—perhaps 
meaning his old self—“must confess that if the policy of the government, 
upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably 
fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made . . . , 
the people will have ceased, to be their own rulers.”41  The Constitution 
simply did not declare plainly what the rights of slaveholders were.  
“From questions of this class spring all our constitutional controversies,” 
he observed, “and we divide upon them into majorities and 
minorities.”42
 
36. Id. 
 
37. Id. at 27–28. 
38. Abraham Lincoln, Notes for Speeches at Columbus and Cincinnati, Ohio (Sept. 
16 & 17, 1859), in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 425, 435. 
39. Id.; see also Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Dayton, Ohio, DAYTON J., Sept. 19, 1859, 
reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 436, 460 (using similar language to that in 
Columbus and Cincinnati speeches). 
40. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address—Final Text (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 
COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 262, 268.  
41. Id.  
42. Id. at 267. 
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No matter how much Lincoln had once hoped to convince 
Americans to protect liberty by deferring to judicial decisions, he was 
deeply enmeshed in a constitutional conflict in which the Supreme 
Court was on the opposing side.  And from 1854 on, he utilized his 
formidable rhetorical skills to win the battle.43
II.  LINCOLN AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS BEFORE THE WAR 
 
In 1858 Lincoln ran against incumbent Stephen A. Douglas for a 
senate seat from Illinois.  Hoping to gain control of the state legislature, 
which in those days elected United States senators, the young 
Republican Party took the unusual step of nominating Lincoln ahead of 
time, at its state convention in June. 
Preparing for the coming battle, Lincoln delivered an address at the 
close of the convention that nominated him.  He raised the stakes of 
what was at issue.  Lincoln insisted that the nation was on a pivot.  
Slaveholders were challenging the antislavery consensus among the 
founding fathers and were well on their way to establishing a nation 
 
43. Many analysts have noted Lincoln’s great skill as a communicator.  One of his great 
virtues, ethicist William L. Miller has pointed out, was “rhetorical power.”  William Lee 
Miller, The Exacting Legacy of a Virtuous President, in LINCOLN’S LEGACY: ETHICS AND 
POLITICS, supra note 21, at 13, 17–18.  Our leading historian of the Civil War, James M. 
McPherson, has observed Lincoln’s “pre-eminent . . . ability to communicate . . . in an 
intelligible, inspiring manner.”  JAMES M. MCPHERSON, How Lincoln Won the War with 
Metaphors, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION 93, 93 
(1991).   Indeed, McPherson has said that “Lincoln won the war with metaphors,” so crucial 
to final victory was maintaining the North’s will to fight.  Id.  Lincoln’s words are sometimes 
compared to poetry, with which he briefly dabbled, and his prose to that of great fiction 
writers such as Mark Twain.  See GEORGE ANASTAPLO, The Poetry of Abraham Lincoln, in 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A CONSTITUTIONAL BIOGRAPHY 135–47 (1999); FRED KAPLAN, 
LINCOLN: THE BIOGRAPHY OF A WRITER 1 (2008).  Edmund Wilson wrote that, “[a]lone 
among American Presidents, it is possible to imagine Lincoln, grown up in a different milieu, 
becoming a distinguished writer of a not merely political kind.”  EDMUND WILSON, 
PATRIOTIC GORE: STUDIES IN THE LITERATURE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 122 (1966). 
 It is true that Lincoln’s rhetoric reached the level of literary art, but in fact his skill at 
making arguments compelling to ordinary Americans grew out of his legal experience.  
Lincoln was a great trial lawyer.  He knew how to make an argument to a jury of ordinary 
Americans.  See DIRCK, supra note 4, at 101–06.  Francis Carpenter, who spent six months in 
the White House preparing a painting of Lincoln’s Cabinet, was struck by how Lincoln 
conveyed abstract thoughts in “the form of a figure of speech, which drove the point home, 
and clinched it, as few abstract reasoners are able to do.”  FRANCIS CARPENTER, SIX 
MONTHS AT THE WHITE HOUSE WITH ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE STORY OF A PICTURE 235–
36 (N.Y., Hurd & Houghton 1866), quoted in MCPHERSON, supra, at 98.  He used the same 
skill when he first tried his hand at politics in Illinois.  An old Springfield friend recollected, 
“I never heard a more effective speaker.”  JOSHUA SPEED, REMINISCENCES OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN AND NOTES OF A VISIT TO CALIFORNIA 17 (Louisville, John P. Morton & Co. 
1884).  He could sway a crowd “as he pleased.”  Id. 
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committed to slavery rather than freedom.  “A house divided against 
itself cannot stand,” he warned.  “[T]his government cannot endure, 
permanently half slave and half free.”44  The Union “will become all one 
thing, or all the other.”45  If proslavery forces won, slavery would sooner 
or later become lawful even in the northern states.  The legal foundation 
was in place, he said—“compounded of the Nebraska doctrine, and the 
Dred Scott decision.”46  The Court had affirmed that the people of the 
states were perfectly free to decide upon slavery “subject only to the 
Constitution.”47  What did that reservation mean?  “[W]e have [a] . . . 
nice little niche, which we may, ere long, see filled with another 
Supreme Court decision, declaring that the Constitution of the United 
States does not permit a state to exclude slavery from its limits.”48  The 
Court would not act immediately, but would do so if the Dred Scott 
ruling were “acquiesced in for a while, and apparently indorsed by the 
people at an election.”49
Lincoln’s argument may seem far-fetched, but in fact his own 
experience had taught him the danger.  Early in his career Lincoln 
represented a Kentucky slaveholder who insisted that he had the right 
to bring his slaves annually to harvest crops on his Illinois farm.  One 
family, which had remained at the farm for nearly two years, claimed 
that their stay had made them free.  Lincoln had argued before Illinois 
Supreme Court justices (riding circuit) that the slave owner’s stated 
intention that the sojourn was temporary was enough to preserve his 
right to their services despite Illinois’s ban on slavery.  Although English 
precedents held that slaves were emancipated upon residing on free soil, 
Lincoln argued that the federal Constitution “established a rule 
different and much more liberal to the owners of slaves, than that 
established and declared by the English courts.”
 
50  The Illinois justices 
rejected the arguments and ruled that a stay of such length emancipated 
the slaves.51
 
44. Abraham Lincoln, “A House Divided”: Speech at Springfield, Illinois, ILL. ST. J., 
June 18, 1858, reprinted in 2 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 461.  
  Lincoln now feared that the U.S. Supreme Court would 
45. Id.  
46. Id. at 462. 
47. Id. at 466. 
48. Id. at 467.  
49. Id. at 464. 
50. STEINER, supra note 4, at 120 (citing primary source). 
51. For full documentation of the case, see 2 THE PAPERS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN:  
LEGAL DOCUMENTS AND CASES 1 (Daniel W. Stowell ed., 2008).  For a full discussion, see 
STEINER, supra note 4, at 103–23.  In a contribution to this symposium, Joseph A. Ranney 
explains how the antislavery Lincoln could have taken the case and made his argument.  See 
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endorse the proposition he himself had advocated so many years earlier. 
With the U.S. Supreme Court taking stronger and stronger 
proslavery ground, Lincoln knew that there was a growing chance that it 
might rule that the Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause 
guaranteed slave owners the right that the Illinois Supreme Court had 
rejected.52  Indeed, a case was working its way through the courts that 
could have served as a vehicle to begin the process.53
The Lincoln–Douglas debates were about the future constitutional 
system of the nation.  They were a clear example of the sort of 
constitutional politics that characterized the Civil War era.  The first 
debate, to be held in Ottawa, Illinois, was announced in newspapers in 
all the surrounding towns.  Lincoln and Douglas supporters organized 
day trains from Chicago, eighty-five miles away.  People poured in all 
morning: singly, in small groups, and in cavalcades and processions with 
banners and signs.  The Chicago train had seventeen cars.  Ottawa was 
covered in bunting; there were bands on every corner, drowned out, the 
Chicago Tribune’s correspondent reported, by the roar of cannon.
  But the point is 
not whether Lincoln’s legal concerns were justified.  It is that he made 
clear that the future constitutional law of slavery—the holdings of the 
Supreme Court itself—would turn on the political decisions of the 
American people. 
54  
Each candidate was escorted into town by a great procession, Lincoln 
having met the Chicago train for the purpose.  Douglas came by carriage 
from Peru, Illinois, twenty miles from Ottawa, his procession growing at 
every town along the way.55  Succeeding debates drew smaller audiences, 
but the smallest still attracted 1,000 to 1,500 people.56  Others featured 
crowds nearly as big as Ottawa’s, with processions and delegations from 
surrounding towns.  At Charleston, in southern Illinois, pro-Douglas 
banners read, “This government was made for whitemen.”57
 
Ranney, supra note 23, at 1326–27. 
  Another 
Douglas banner, inscribed “Negro Equality,” bore a caricature of a 
52. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
53. The case was Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860), in which the New York Court 
of Appeals had granted a writ of habeas corpus and freed slaves of an owner when they had 
spent the night in New York City to transfer vessels on their way from Virginia to Texas.  See 
id. at 562–64.  Republicans expected it to be taken to the Supreme Court.  See PAUL 
FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 47–48 
(1997). 
54. GOOD, supra note 24, at 93. 
55. Id. at 92–95. 
56. The smallest audience appears to have been at Jonesboro, Illinois.  Id. at 119–21. 
57. Id. at 129. 
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white man, black woman, and their mulatto child.58
The debates were not only aimed at the immediate audiences.  Allen 
Guelzo’s recent book on the debates makes clear that their real function 
was to disseminate Lincoln’s and Douglas’s views to a much larger 
audience through the burgeoning newspapers of the times.
 
59  Illinois’s 
leading Republican and Democratic newspapers sent correspondents to 
describe the events, and their reports were republished in local dailies 
and weeklies all over the state.  By the time they concluded, word would 
reach the rest of the nation, and Lincoln, virtually unknown outside 
Illinois before the debates, would be bombarded with requests for 
copies of his addresses and invited to repeat his performance on the 
stump for Republican candidates throughout what was then called the 
West.  The flurry of engagements culminated in his address at the 
Cooper Institute in New York, in which he repeated the themes honed 
in 1858 and which catapulted him into serious contention for the 
Republican presidential nomination. By 1860, Republicans would 
publish the debates, selling tens of thousands of copies.60
Professor Guelzo aptly subtitled his book on the Lincoln–Douglas 
debates “The Debates That Defined America.”
 
61
 
58. Id. at 129–30. 
  From beginning to 
end, Lincoln and Douglas offered their audiences a choice between 
59. ALLEN C. GUELZO, LINCOLN AND DOUGLAS: THE DEBATES THAT DEFINED 
AMERICA 95–98 (2007). 
60. Id. at 303–06.  Lincoln had to turn down an invitation to speak in Boston.  Letter 
from Abraham Lincoln to Henry L. Pierce and Others (Apr. 6, 1859), in 3 COLLECTED 
WORKS, supra note 4, at 374.  Lincoln’s COLLECTED WORKS reprints or alludes to speeches 
in Iowa, Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Kansas.  See Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Council 
Bluffs, Iowa, COUNCIL BLUFFS BUGLE, Aug. 17, 1859, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, 
supra note 4, at 396, 396–97; Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Columbus, Ohio, ILL. ST. J., Sept. 
24, 1859, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 400, 400–25; Abraham Lincoln, 
Notes for Speeches at Columbus and Cincinnati, Ohio, supra note 38, at 425, 425–36; 
Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Dayton, Ohio, supra note 39, at 436, 436–37; Abraham Lincoln, 
Speech at Cincinnati, Ohio, ILL. ST. J., Oct. 7, 1859, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra 
note 4, at 438, 438–62; Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Indianapolis, Indiana, INDIANAPOLIS 
ATLAS, Sept. 19, 1859, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 463, 463–70; 
Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Beloit, Wisconsin, BELOIT J., Oct. 5, 1859, reprinted in 3 
COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 482, 482–84; Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Janesville, 
Wisconsin, JANESVILLE MORNING GAZETTE, Oct. 4, 1859, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED 
WORKS, supra note 4, at 484, 484–86; Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Elwood, Kansas, ELWOOD 
FREE PRESS, Dec. 3, 1859, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 495, 495–97; 
Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Leavenworth, Kansas, ILL. ST. J., Dec. 12, 1859, reprinted in 3 
COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 497, 497–502.  See also Abraham Lincoln, Address at 
Cooper Institute, New York City, N.Y. TRIB., Feb. 28, 1860, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED 
WORKS, supra note 4, at 522, 522–50. 
61. GUELZO, supra note 59. 
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opposing constitutional regimes.62  Douglas defended the Dred Scott 
decision, which enshrined the legal regime of the slaveholding republic 
in constitutional law, insisting that the Court’s interpretation was 
binding on all Americans.63  Trying to minimize the increasingly 
proslavery tendency of constitutional development, Douglas stressed the 
federal nature of the Union.  He blasted Lincoln for saying the Union 
could not persist half slave, half free, insisting that the framers 
established federalism precisely to enable states with radically different 
economic and social systems to coexist in the Union.  It was the duty 
of Americans not to care whether people within other states or 
territories voted slavery up or down or how they dealt with their free 
black populations.  It was simply none of their business.  “[I]f we will 
only act conscientiously and rigidly upon this great principle . . . , we will 
continue at peace one with another.”64
Over and again, Douglas reiterated his conviction that the United 
States was a white man’s country, in which the African American had no 
rights of citizenship.  Echoing Taney’s Dred Scott opinion, he insisted 
that 
 
the signers of the Declaration [of Independence] had no 
reference to the negro whatever when they declared all 
men to be created equal.  They desired to express by that 
phrase, white men, . . . and had no reference either to the 
negro, the savage Indians, the Fejee, the Malay, or any 
other inferior and degraded race, when they spoke of the 
equality of men.65
 
62. The debates may be found in Lincoln’s COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4.  First 
Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Ottawa, Illinois, supra note 34, at 1–37; Second Debate 
with Stephen A. Douglas at Freeport, Illinois, CHI. PRESS & TRIB., Aug. 27, 1858, reprinted in 
3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 38–76; Third Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at 
Jonesboro, Illinois, CHI. PRESS & TRIB., Sept. 15, 1858, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, 
supra note 4, at 102–44; Fourth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Charleston, Illinois, CHI. 
PRESS & TRIB., Sept. 18, 1858, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 145–201; 
Fifth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Galesburg, Illinois, CHI. PRESS & TRIB., Oct. 7, 1858, 
reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 207–44; Sixth Debate with Stephen A. 
Douglas at Quincy, Illinois, CHI. PRESS & TRIB., Oct. 13, 1858, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED 
WORKS, supra note 4, at 245–83; Seventh and Last Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Alton, 
Illinois, CHI. PRESS & TRIB., Oct. 15, 1858, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, 
at 283–325.  These debates are summarized and put into a political context in GOOD, supra 
note 24, and GUELZO, supra note 59. 
 
63. See, e.g., Third Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Jonesboro, Illinois, supra note 62, 
at 112, 142–43; Fifth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Galesburg, Illinois, supra note 62, at 
243–44; Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Quincy, Illinois, supra note 62, at 268.  
64. First Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Ottawa, Illinois, supra note 34, at 11–12.   
65. Third Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Jonesboro, Illinois, supra note 62, at 113. 
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He repeated the centerpiece of slave-republic constitutionalism 
everywhere, reaffirming that 
this government was established on the white basis.  It 
was made by white men, for the benefit of white men and 
their posterity forever, and never should be administered 
by any except white men. . . .  I declare that a negro 
ought not to be a citizen . . . and . . . ought not to be on an 
equality with white men.66
Lincoln expressed a radically different ideal.  While Douglas spoke 
of the Union as a confederacy of potentially hostile states, coexisting 
peacefully only as long as the general government stayed out of state 
affairs, Lincoln spoke in terms of a national community of shared 
interests.  Slavery threatened that community.  “Have we ever had any 
quarrel over the fact that they have laws in Louisiana designed to 
regulate the commerce that springs from the production of sugar?  Or 
because we have a different class relative to the production of flour in 
this State?” he asked.  “Not at all.  They are the very cements of this 
Union. . . .  But has it been so with this element of slavery?  Have we not 
always had quarrels and difficulties over it?”
 
67  He blasted Douglas’s 
claim that maintaining the Union required indifference to decisions 
about slavery.  Douglas, the Democratic party, and the Supreme Court 
were all conspiring to make slavery rather than freedom the cornerstone 
of the republic, he warned.  “When [Douglas] says he ‘cares not whether 
slavery is voted down or voted up,’ . . . he is in my judgment . . . 
eradicating the light of reason and the love of liberty in this American 
people.”68
Most of all, Lincoln insisted that the United States was founded on 
the principles of the Declaration of Independence—that all men are 
created equal, with equal rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness.  During the secession crisis, he would tell a Philadelphia 
audience that he had “never had a feeling politically that did not spring” 
from that document.
 
69
 
66. Fourth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Charleston, Illinois, supra note 62, at 177–
78.  See also First Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Ottawa, Illinois, supra note 34, at 9–11; 
Fifth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Galesburg, Illinois, supra note 62, at 216–17; Sixth 
Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Quincy, Illinois, supra note 62, at 296–97. 
  In a fragmentary sketch which he never made 
public, he mused that the Constitution itself was framed in order to 
67. Third Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Jonesboro, Illinois, supra note 62, at 120, 
121. 
68. First Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Ottawa, Illinois, supra note 34, at 29. 
69. Abraham Lincoln, Speech in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Feb. 23, 1861, reprinted in 4 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 240, 240. 
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promote the ideal that lay behind it.  That ideal was the Declaration’s 
principle of liberty for all.  Drawing upon the language of Proverbs 
25:11—“A word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in pictures of 
silver”—Lincoln likened the Declaration to the “apple of gold.”  The 
Union and the Constitution were pictures of silver made “to adorn, and 
preserve,” what was even more important.70
 
  Again and again he 
denounced Douglas’s view that the Declaration’s affirmation of equal 
rights applied only to whites: 
I believe that the entire records of the world, from the 
date of the Declaration of Independence up to within 
three years ago, may be searched in vain for one single 
affirmation, from one single man, that the negro was not 
included in the Declaration of Independence[,] . . . until 
the necessities of the present policy of the Democratic 
party, in regard to slavery, had to invent that 
affirmation.71
 
 
In the end, Lincoln argued, the struggle was between a free America 
and a slave America.  The fundamental confrontation was between 
those who thought slavery was wrong and would do what was 
constitutionally permitted to put it on the road to ultimate extinction, 
and those who did not see it as wrong and did not care whether it was 
perpetuated.  “That is the real issue,” Lincoln said as he moved to 
conclude the debates.  “It is the eternal struggle between these two 
principles—right and wrong—throughout the world. . . .  It is the same 
spirit that says, ‘You work and toil and earn bread, and I’ll eat it.’”72
More Illinois voters cast ballots for Republican legislative candidates 
than Democratic ones, but the distribution of the votes elected more 
Democrats than Republicans, and Douglas was returned to the Senate.  
But no one who voted could have doubted the constitutional issues at 
stake.  Nor did anyone when Republicans nominated Lincoln for the 
presidency. James McPherson calls the ensuing election “The 
Revolution of 1860.”
 
73
 
70. Abraham Lincoln, Fragment on the Constitution and the Union (possibly Jan. 1861), 
in 4 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 168, 168–69. 
  From the perspective of white Southerners, 
71. Fifth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Galesburg, Illinois, supra note 62, at 220. 
72. Seventh and Last Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Alton, Illinois, supra note 62, at 
315. 
73. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 202–33 
(1988). 
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Lincoln’s election signaled the end of the constitutional regime to which 
they had pledged allegiance and the beginning of one to which they 
would not assent.  By the time of Lincoln’s inauguration, the states of 
the Deep South had seceded, and efforts were underway in Congress to 
frame a compromise that would have entrenched the constitutionalism 
of the slaveholding republic.  Lincoln would have none of it.  “We have 
just carried an election on principles fairly stated to the people,” he 
said.74  He opposed all compromise proposals that would threaten the 
constitutional transformation for which he had stood.  He denied the 
right of the South to secede rather than accept the result.  The 
consequence was war.75
III.  LINCOLN AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE CIVIL WAR 
 
As historians and others have made abundantly clear, Lincoln made 
aggressive use of presidential power to preserve the Union and end 
slavery during the Civil War.76  Lincoln’s opponents called him a despot 
and a tyrant.  Ironically, in light of Lincoln’s worries about passion in 
politics, his critics thundered, “Fanaticism rules the hour.  The fanatic is 
on the throne.”77  They complained about Republican “doctrines 
subversive of the fundamental principles of civil liberty, and tending 
directly to the overthrow of the Constitution of the United States.”78
But it never occurred to Lincoln’s critics that they could turn to the 
Supreme Court to arrest the desperate course of events.  To be sure, 
there were important court cases that tested Lincoln’s use of 
presidential powers.  The Prize Cases
 
79 turned on the legality of 
Lincoln’s blockade before Congress authorized it, with implications for 
the legality of his other unilateral actions as well.  Clement L. 
Vallandigham, an Ohio congressman arrested, tried by military 
commission, and banished, appealed his conviction.80
 
74. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to James T. Hale (Jan. 11, 1861), in 4 COLLECTED 
WORKS, supra note 4, at 172, 172. 
 
75. See generally MCPHERSON, supra note 73, at 234–75. 
76. For a longer discussion with citations of the individual orders and proclamations, see 
Benedict, supra note 1, at 930–39. 
77. The Constitution, PAPERS FROM THE SOC’Y FOR THE DIFFUSION OF POL. 
KNOWLEDGE (N.Y., Soc’y for the Diffusion of Pol. Knowledge 1863), reprinted in 1 UNION 
PAMPHLETS OF THE CIVIL WAR, 1861–1865, at 525, 526 (Frank Freidel ed., 1967).  
78. Id. at 530. 
79. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
80. Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864). 
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Modern lawyers point breathlessly to the “catastrophic” 
consequences that would have followed a decision against the legality of 
the blockade.81  Arguing for the government, attorney Richard Henry 
Dana, with typical self-importance, wrote Charles Francis Adams that a 
decision against the government “would end the war.”82  But that was 
bosh.  Finding for the owners of ships seized during Lincoln’s pre-
congressionally-authorized blockade might have cost some money in 
restitution, nothing more.  In the event, newspapers gave the decision 
upholding the constitutionality of Lincoln’s actions a couple of 
paragraphs of coverage, buried with other Washington news.83
By contrast, the Vallandigham case was important, and newspapers 
did pay attention to it.  If the justices ruled Vallandigham’s trial illegal, 
they would add the weight of the nation’s highest tribunal to the voices 
charging Lincoln with a despotic assault on civil liberty.  But no one 
thought that the Supreme Court could by judicial fiat protect American 
citizens from presidential violations of civil liberties.  Thus, when the 
great constitutional lawyer George Ticknor Curtis helped to found the 
Society for the Diffusion of Political Knowledge, he acknowledged that 
only the people could arrest Lincoln’s assault on the Constitution.  
“[E]ither these doctrines must be met by discussion and refutation and 
by the peaceful operations of the ballot-box,” he said, “or they must go 
on until they have completed their mischief and property, government, 
social order, and all things else sink into confusion, to be followed by . . . 
an absolute despotism.”
 
84
Lincoln, his Republican allies, and his Democratic opponents all 
turned to the American people to resolve the constitutional issues raised 
by the war.  They did so through political platforms, public addresses, 
speeches in Congress and on the stump, and public letters.  They 
publicized their views through newspapers, pamphlets, broadsides, 
cartoons, songs, and banners.  The appeals ranged from complex and 
sophisticated legal arguments, to Lincoln’s more-accessible ones, to 
simplistic stump speeches, pithy slogans, and hard-hitting cartoons.  
 
 
 
81. JAMES F. SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY: SLAVERY, SECESSION, 
AND THE PRESIDENT’S WAR POWERS 225 (2006).  Brian McGinty likewise describes the dire 
prospects of losing the case, yet acknowledges that Lincoln would have recovered rather 
easily.  BRIAN MCGINTY, LINCOLN AND THE SUPREME COURT 141 (2008).  
82. Letter from Richard Henry Dana to Charles Francis Adams (Mar. 9, 1863), in 2 
CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, RICHARD HENRY DANA: A BIOGRAPHY 266, 267 (1890). 
83. See, e.g., Washington News, CINCINNATI DAILY COM., Mar. 11, 1863, at 3. 
84. The Constitution, supra note 77, at 530.  
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Figure 1. Opponents of the Lincoln administration’s restrictions on civil 
liberties and its antislavery policies founded the Society for the Diffusion 
of Political Knowledge in 1863. It published numerous pamphlets 
containing addresses, letters, and essays arguing the unconstitutionality of 
Lincoln’s actions. Rare Book and Special Collections, Library of 
Congress. 
The first pamphlet issued by the Society for the Diffusion of Political 
Knowledge was entitled simply The Constitution.  Emblazoned on the 
cover was the Society’s hopeful assertion: “When a Party in Power 
Violates the Constitution and Disregards State-Rights, Plain Men Read 
Pamphlets.”85
The Society published erudite essays and addresses and more-
accessible speeches.  But Lincoln’s opponents also sought to tap into 
powerful emotions.  The Lincoln Catechism, circulated during the 
 
 
85. Id. at xiv (pamphlet 21). 
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presidential campaign of 1864, set out the “beauties of despotism” that 
Lincoln had inaugurated on behalf of African Americans.86
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The Lincoln Catechism, designed to illustrate “the beauties of 
despotism,” harnessed racial prejudice to constitutional criticisms of 
Lincoln’s civil-liberties restrictions. It was aimed at a different audience 
from that of the Society for the Diffusion of Political Knowledge’s more 
erudite productions. Library of Congress. 
 The Lincoln Catechism posed the question, “What is the 
Constitution?”87  The response was supposed to be, “A compact with 
hell—now obsolete.”88
Abraham Africanus the First. . . .  What is a President? A 
general agent for negroes. . . .  What did the Constitution 
mean by freedom of the Press? Throwing Democratic 
newspapers out of the mails. . . .  What is Trial by jury? 
Trial by military commission. . . .  What is the meaning of 
the promise that, “no person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law?”  That 
any person may be deprived of life, liberty and property, 
whom the President orders to be so stripped.
  Who had rendered the Constitution obsolete? 
89
In sum, what was the meaning of the presidential oath to preserve, 
 
 
86. THE LINCOLN CATECHISM: WHEREIN THE ECCENTRICITIES & BEAUTIES OF 
DESPOTISM ARE FULLY SET FORTH: A GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1864, at 
1 (N.Y., J.F. Feeks 1864). 
87. Id. at 3. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 3–7. 
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protect, and defend the Constitution?  “That he will do all in his power 
to subvert and destroy it.”90  Democrats even published a German 
edition.91
The Black Republican Prayer, circulated on a single sheet, 
beseeched the president: 
 
[T]o regard not the constitution, but prosecute the war 
against our Southern brethren, and free dear Sambo—
that he may become white and equal with ourselves. . . .  
O centralize thy power, that we may become a strong 
government—that the people will kneel before thy Royal 
Highness and worship thee . . . .92
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Democrats circulated the Black Republican Prayer on a single 
sheet, linking Lincoln’s “centralization” of government power to his 
commitment to freedom for African Americans. Courtesy of the 
Houghton Library, Harvard University. 
 
90. Id. at 9. 
91. DER LINCOLN KATECHISMUS: WORIN DIE SCHÖNHEITEN UND EXCENTRITÄTEN DES 
DESPOTISMUS VOLLSTÄNDIG DARGESTELLT SIND: EIN WEGWEISER ZUR 
PRÄSIDENTENWAHL VON 1864 (N.Y., J.F. Feeks 1864). 
92. BLACK REPUBLICAN PRAYER (n.d.). 
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The most important statements of the positions taken on 
constitutional issues appeared in the state and national party platforms.  
The 1864 Democratic platform charged that “under the pretense of a 
military necessity of war-power higher than the Constitution, the 
Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty 
and private right alike trodden down.”93  “[T]he aim and object of the 
Democratic party,” in contrast, was “to preserve the Federal Union and 
the rights of the States unimpaired.”94  The platform blasted 
infringements of civil liberty, suppression of free speech and press, 
invasions of state rights, and the imposition of test oaths, all of which 
were “calculated to prevent a restoration of the Union and the 
perpetuation of a Government deriving its just powers from the consent 
of the governed.”95  Only a cessation of hostilities followed ultimately by 
a convention of the states, or some other alternative, could restore “the 
Federal Union of the States.”96
In its first plank, the Republican party pledged to maintain “the 
paramount authority of the Constitution and laws of the United 
States . . . by force of arms.”
  Never once did the platform refer to 
“the United States of America.”   
97
 
  Platforms were published in their entirety 
in newspapers of both parties, which added their praise and 
condemnations.  They were circulated in pamphlet form, usually with 
the letters of acceptance of the candidates.  Summaries might even be 
printed, along with images of candidates, on envelopes used to circulate 
campaign materials.  Newspapers printed images that illustrated party 
positions on the great constitutional issue even more concisely and 
graphically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93. NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840–1972, at 34 (5th ed., Donald Bruce Johnson & 
Kirk H. Porter eds., 1975). 
94. Id. at 34. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 35.  Lincoln’s supporters actually referred to themselves as the Union party, 
claiming to be a coalition of Republicans, War Democrats, and other unionists. 
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Figure 4. Republican Campaign Envelope, 1864. Lincoln Collection, 
Massachusetts Historical Society. Courtesy of the Massachusetts 
Historical Society. 
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Figure 5. Campaign squib, Newark Advocate, 1864. Democratic 
newspapers printed images concisely connecting their candidates and 
platform to devotion to the Constitution. The newspaper printed this 
squib throughout the 1864 campaign. 
 
Republicans identified their principles with liberty, while linking the 
Democratic platform to disunion and racist thuggery. Platforms 
Illustrated (Figure 6 below), an 1864 presidential campaign print, made 
the point graphically.  It showed Union generals and respected 
Republican statesmen, including Charles Sumner, known for his 
commitment to black equality, carrying the Republican platform, upon 
which Columbia, the American goddess of liberty, expressed confidence 
in Lincoln.  Republicans depicted the pro-peace Democratic platform as 
“cheesy,” with the Democrats’ pro-war candidate General George B. 
McClellan unable to stand on it.  They portrayed the sort of Irish and 
other thugs who had murdered African Americans in the New York 
draft riots as upholding it. 
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Columbia was regularly pictured as wearing what was known as a 
“liberty cap,” as in the Platforms Illustrated print. Republicans 
appropriated the liberty cap and tied it to the flag, to symbolize the 
slogan that Daniel Webster had articulated in his famous 1830 paean to 
unionism—“Liberty and Union, now and for ever, one and 
inseparable!”98
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Republican Ticket, New Hampshire, 1860. Republicans regularly 
illustrated their voting tickets with the American flag staff crowned by a 
liberty cap. Such tickets were actually deposited in ballot boxes by voters. 
In this case, the ticket was evidently used by an observer to keep count of 
votes. Alfred Whital Stern Collection of Lincolnia, Rare Book and Special 
Collections, Library of Congress. 
 
98. 6 REG. DEB. 58, 80 (1830) (Webster’s Second Speech on Foot’s Resolution), 
reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER 3, 75 (J.W. McIntyre ed., 
1903). 
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The “Liberty and Union” slogan, in the end, summarized the 
Republicans’ constitutional position—that the Union must be preserved 
and rededicated to liberty by abolishing slavery.  Democrats understood 
the symbolism full well.  And, as Figure 8 reflects, they made clear what 
it meant: 
 
 
Figure 8. The Northern Coat of Arms, possibly 1863. A Democratic print 
makes clear that Republican paeans to liberty cloak a commitment to 
abolishing slavery and guaranteeing rights to African Americans. 
Courtesy of the Library Company of Philadelphia. 
 
Lincoln addressed his inaugural address and his messages to 
Congress to a broad public.  In his first inaugural address, he made his 
great case against secession, for a deeper nationality underlying the 
Constitution, and for forbearance in settling constitutional disputes.  He 
addressed his words to the people, North and South.  “My countrymen, 
one and all, think calmly and well, upon this whole subject,” he 
1360 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [93:1333 
implored.99  The language of the Constitution did not expressly settle the 
constitutional issues surrounding slavery, he urged.  They could be 
decided only “by the judgment of this great tribunal, the American 
people.”100
Lincoln wrote.  He defended his civil-liberties policy in public letters 
well known to scholars, addressed to New York, Ohio, and Kentucky 
Democrats.  He defended his emancipation policy in equally well-known 
public letters to Horace Greeley, the radical Republican editor of the 
New York Tribune, and to a Springfield friend, James C. Conkling.
 
101  
He sent these directly to newspapers for publication.  He encouraged 
the Union League and Loyal League to issue pamphlets and campaign 
materials.102  And then, of course, there is the Gettysburg Address—the 
most concise and compelling statement of Lincoln’s vision of a nation 
built upon the principles of the Declaration of Independence, a 
distillation of thousands of words into their essence, reprinted, it 
appears, in every newspaper in the country, large and small, daily and 
weekly.103  It was, observers realized at the time, a near-perfect example 
of clarifying complex ideas for the public.  “Thousands who would not 
read the long, elaborate oration” that Edward Everett had delivered at 
Gettysburg on the same subject, a Philadelphia newspaper observed, 
“will read the President’s few words, and not many will do it without a 
moistening of the eye and a swelling of the heart.”104
 
99. Lincoln, supra note 40, at 270. 
  They remain 
immensely powerful.  As Harper’s Weekly editor George William Curtis 
said at the time, “The few words . . . were from the heart to the heart.  
100. Id. 
101. See, e.g., Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Horace Greeley (Aug. 22, 1862), in 5 
COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 388, 388–89; Abraham Lincoln, Letter to Erastus 
Corning and Others, N.Y. TRIB., June 15, 1863, reprinted in 6 COLLECTED WORKS, supra 
note 4, at 260; Abraham Lincoln, Letter to Matthew Birchard and Others, N.Y. TRIB., July 9, 
1863, reprinted in 6 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 300; Letter from Abraham Lincoln 
to James C. Conkling (Aug. 29, 1863), in 6 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 406; Letter 
from Abraham Lincoln to Albert G. Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), in 7 COLLECTED WORKS, supra 
note 4, at 281. 
102. See PHILLIP SHAW PALUDAN, “THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE”: 
LINCOLN, PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE NORTH DURING THE AMERICAN 
CIVIL WAR 6–7 (1993). 
103. Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at 
Gettysburg, N.Y. TRIB., Nov. 20, 1863, reprinted in 7 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 19.  
An outstanding analysis of the deep meaning of the Gettysburg Address is found in WILLS, 
supra note 2.  
104. WILLIAM E. BARTON, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: WHAT HE INTENDED TO SAY; 
WHAT HE SAID; WHAT HE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID; WHAT HE WISHED HE HAD 
SAID 119 (1930) (quoting PHILA. EVENING BULLETIN). 
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They cannot be read, even, without kindling emotion.”105
It was through such constitutional politics that the great 
constitutional issues of the day were decided.  This process, of course, is 
not as clear-cut as the legal process.  The legal process focuses the issue, 
forces a confrontation directly upon it, and involves a tribunal 
specifically enjoined to disregard extraneous matters.  Not so the public 
tribunal to which Lincoln and his opponents appealed.  Take, for 
example, the civil-liberties issue that Clement L. Vallandigham 
precipitated in 1863.
 
106
In April 1863, Major General Ambrose Burnside, military 
commander of the Department of Ohio, which included the states of the 
old Northwest from Ohio to Wisconsin, issued orders barring 
expressions of sympathy for the enemy and declared that violators 
would be tried before military commissions.  Vallandigham, a trenchant 
opponent of using force to restore the Union, determined to challenge 
Burnside both to force the civil-liberties issue and to boost his standing 
with Ohio Democrats.  He baited Burnside with bitter anti-war speeches 
until the general was compelled to arrest and try him in May.  
Newspapers published transcripts of the military trial, the subsequent 
arguments seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court, and the 
decision of the court denying the petition.
  Vallandigham’s decision to force the issue was 
directly related to his ambition to seize the leadership of the Ohio 
Democratic party from rivals who had earlier shunted his ambition for 
statewide office aside—an illustration of how political aspirations can be 
entwined with the articulation of constitutional principles. 
107  Democrats in 
Vallandigham’s hometown of Dayton rioted, burning down the building 
housing the city’s Republican newspaper.108  Protest meetings erupted all 
over the country.109
 
105. Id. at 121. 
  The editor of the New York World, the nation’s 
106. For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between Vallandigham’s political 
ambitions and the constitutional positions he took, see Michael Les Benedict, Vallandigham: 
Constitutionalist and Copperhead, 3 TIMELINE 16 (1986).  See also MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, 
FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 306–56 (2000). 
107. See, e.g., Trial of C.L. Vallandigham—The Specifications and Evidence, DAILY 
OHIO STATESMAN (Columbus), May 10, 1863, at 1; The Application of Hon. C.L. 
Vallandigham for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, DAILY OHIO STATESMAN, May 13, 1863, at 2; 
The Vallandigham Habeas Corpus Case, DAILY OHIO STATESMAN, May 19, 1863, at 1.  
108. Last Night’s Report, CLEVELAND DAILY PLAIN DEALER, May 7, 1863, at 2. 
109. Frank J. Williams, When Albany Challenged the President, 8 N.Y. ARCHIVES 31, 33 
(2009), available at http://www.archives.nysed.gov/apt/magazine/archivesmagwinter09_ 
williams.shtml. 
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leading Democratic newspaper, penned a scathing public letter to the 
president, reprinted in Democratic newspapers across the country.110
The embarrassed Lincoln commuted Vallandigham’s sentence from 
imprisonment to exile beyond Union lines.  To the consternation of 
Ohio’s Democratic leaders, in June 1863, rank-and-file activists 
overwhelmingly nominated Vallandigham their candidate for governor.  
As a reporter put it, Vallandigham’s arrest and banishment “had stirred 
the heart of the people to its inmost depths,” and they came to the 
nominating convention “to express their deep and uncompromising 
hostility to the violations of the Constitutions of the Union and of Ohio 
in the conduct of the war.”
 
111  “The question with all was to determine 
whether we lived under a government of laws, where the Constitution 
was the guide, or a despotism in which the will of the Executive and his 
military subordinates was supreme.”112  Seventeen of the twenty-three 
planks of the party’s campaign platform related to civil liberties.113
Republicans immediately moved to muddy the waters.  The real 
issue, wrote the Ohio State Journal, was “Vallandigham, peace, and 
disunion.”
 
114
 
  Harper’s Weekly famously portrayed Lincoln’s critics as 
deadly copperhead snakes, threatening liberty and the Union. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. The Copperhead Party, Harper’s Weekly, Feb. 28, 1863. Again 
the Republican iconography linked Liberty, represented as a goddess, and 
Union, serving as her shield. 
 
110. Editorial, A Scathing Letter!, NEWARK (N.J.) ADVOCATE, June 12, 1863, at 1. 
111. The Democratic State Convention—Unparalleled Outpouring of the People, DAILY  
OHIO STATESMAN (Columbus), June 12, 1863, at 2.  
112. Id. 
113. Platform of the Vallandigham Democracy of Ohio, N.Y. HERALD, June 14, 1863, 
at 8. 
114. Letter of the Albany Committee to the President, DAILY OHIO ST. J. (Columbus), 
June 15, 1863, at 2. 
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But Republicans were worried.  Harper’s editor George W. Williams 
complained: 
[T]he question is . . . shall we better ourselves and help 
the country by locking this man up in a fortress, instead 
of letting him prate his seditious trash to every one who 
will listen?  To that question the reply must be in the 
negative.  The mistake which has all along been made in 
this war by the Government and many of its agents has 
been not trusting the people sufficiently.  Arresting 
seditious talkers implies a fear that the people have not 
sense or strength of mind enough to resist the appeals of 
sedition.115
Illinois Senator Lyman Trumbull, a former judge and chairman of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee—the committee charged with 
responsibility for the federal courts and matters of law—warned 
Republicans that they had allowed Democrats to make false issues.  
“The great charge, the charge that has damaged the Administration 
above all others, is that we are in favor of the exercise of arbitrary 
power, that we are opposed to the freedom of speech and opinion in 
favor of curtailing personal liberty, and in favor of a despotism.”
 
116  
Republicans should not permit that issue to be made.  “We have been 
the advocates of free speech for the last forty years, and should not 
allow the party which during that whole time has advocated the gag to 
usurp our place.  We are fighting for the restoration of the Union and 
the preservation of the Constitution, and all the liberties it guarantees to 
every citizen.”117
Vallandigham’s sympathetic biographer, Frank L. Klement, intuited 
how the events paralleled a legal confrontation.  He entitled his chapter 
on them “Lincoln vs. Vallandigham: Contention for Public Opinion.”
  Democratic newspapers such as the Ohio Statesman 
happily published Trumbull’s address on page one. 
118  
Lincoln carefully responded to the Democratic protests against 
Vallandigham’s treatment, addressing a public letter to the organizers of 
a protest meeting in Albany, New York.119
 
115. The Arrest of Vallandigham, HARPER’S WKLY., May 30, 1863, at 338. 
  Vallandigham was not 
arrested for opposing the war or attacking the administration, he 
116. A Remarkable Speech by Senator Trumbull, DAILY OHIO STATESMAN (Columbus), 
June 12, 1863, at 1. 
117. Id. 
118. FRANK L. KLEMENT, THE LIMITS OF DISSENT: CLEMENT L. VALLANDIGHAM 
AND THE CIVIL WAR 173–89 (Fordham Univ. Press 1998) (1970). 
119. Lincoln, Letter to Erastus Corning and Others, supra note 101, at 260. 
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insisted.  If he had been, “I concede that the arrest was wrong.”120  He 
was arrested because he was working, “with some effect,” to obstruct 
enlistment and encourage desertions.121  As for the use of military 
tribunals, “certain proceedings are constitutional when, in cases of 
rebellion or Invasion, the public Safety requires them, which would not 
be constitutional when, in absence of rebellion or invasion, the public 
Safety does not require them.”122  Finally, Lincoln conceded his own 
misgivings.  “I have to say it gave me pain when I learned that Mr. V. 
had been arrested, . . . and . . . it will afford me great pleasure to 
discharge him so soon as I can, by any means, believe the public safety 
will not suffer by it.”123  It was true that there was “great confusion at 
first” in the treatment of dissenters.124  (Lincoln had suspended the 
privilege of habeas corpus on his own authority, and Congress had only 
a few months earlier passed a law on the subject.)  He hoped that as 
“more regular channels” were established for dealing with the problem, 
“the necessity for arbitrary dealing with them gradually decreases,” and 
he looked forward to the time when the necessity “would cease 
altogether.”125
The protest and Lincoln’s response were republished in Democratic 
and Republican newspapers across the country, along with editorial 
comment on one side and the other.
 
126  A few weeks later Lincoln wrote 
a similar response to Ohio critics, with harsher reflections on their 
loyalty.127
 
120. Id. at 266. 
  The president’s letter was a perfect response, the Cleveland 
121. Id.  
122. Id. at 267. 
123. Id. at 269. 
124. Id. 
125. Id.  
126. See, e.g., Correspondence in Relation to the Public Meeting at Albany, N.Y., 
CINCINNATI DAILY COM., June 17, 1863, at 1 (Republican publication); Mr. Lincoln’s Reply, 
DAILY OHIO ST. J. (Columbus), June 18, 1863, at 1 (Republican publication); Mr. Lincoln’s 
Reply, DAILY CLEVELAND HERALD, June 16, 1863, at 2; The President on Military Arrests, 
CHI. TRIB., June 17, 1863, at 2 (Republican publication); The President on Arbitrary Arrests, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1863, at 4 (Republican publication); Correspondence; In Relation to the 
Public Meeting at Albany, N.Y., NO. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE (Phila.), June 15, 1863, at 1 
(Republican publication); Important Correspondence; Mr. Lincoln on Military Arrests, N.Y. 
HERALD, June 14, 1863, at 1 (Independent Democratic publication); The Views of the 
President upon the Arrest of Mr. Vallandigham, CINCINNATI DAILY ENQUIRER, June 16, 
1863, at 2 (Democratic publication); From Washington, WIS. DAILY PATRIOT (Madison), 
June 16, 1863, at 2 (Democratic publication); Mr. Lincoln’s Letter, WIS. DAILY PATRIOT, 
June 18, 1863, at 1. 
127. Lincoln, Letter to Matthew Birchard and Others, supra note 101, at 300. 
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Herald gushed.  “We beg every one to read it.”128  “The temper and the 
abnegation of self are charming traits in the President’s reply, while the 
sound, invulnerable logic will command the respect of every man who 
has sense enough to appreciate correct deductions.”129  The Democratic 
Cincinnati Enquirer was less enthusiastic.  The president’s constitutional 
justification for suspending habeas corpus meant that “[t]he people . . . 
have no liberties, but hold them and their lives simply at the pleasure of 
Mr. Lincoln.  The Constitution is utterly swept away and annihilated.”130
Democrats continued to insist that the Ohio gubernatorial election 
was a referendum on the protection of civil liberties, as they campaigned 
for Vallandigham and against the Republican candidate, John Brough.  
In the run-up to the vote, the official organ of the Ohio Democratic 
party reminded its readers in a squib on its editorial page that the issue 
was “Vallandigham and the Supremacy of the Laws Against Brough and 
Arbitrary Illegal Arrests/Vallandigham and Civil Liberty Against 
Brough and Despotism.”
 
131
But Lincoln managed to defuse the issue.  At Trumbull’s behest, he 
countermanded Burnside’s order closing the Chicago Times, which had 
been bitterly criticizing Lincoln over the Vallandigham affair.  Burnside 
immediately withdrew another order banning circulation of the New 
York World in his Midwestern military district.
 
132
What can we make of such constitutional politics?  They do not 
establish clear decisions, as does a court case.  Lincoln and his allies won 
first by reducing the salience of the civil-liberties issue and then by 
directing attention away from it.  Yet the contest certainly affected 
constitutional policy.  Lincoln came to recognize the danger that civil-
liberties issues presented to his political success and thus to the 
  With the civil-liberties 
issues losing traction, Republicans were able to turn attention to 
Vallandigham’s proposal for an armistice and negotiations.  
Vallandigham lost by 100,000 votes. 
 
128. Mr. Lincoln’s Reply to the Ohio Vallandigham Committee, DAILY CLEVELAND 
HERALD, July 8, 1863, at 2.  
129. Id. 
130. The Views of the President upon the Arrest of Mr. Vallandigham, supra note 126, 
at 2.  
131. DAILY OHIO STATESMAN (Columbus), Oct. 11, 1863, at 2.  The October 12 and 13 
issues of the Statesman are lost, but it is likely that the editors reprinted the squib those days, 
leading up to election day on the 13th. 
132. See Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Edwin M. Stanton (June 4, 1863), in 6 
COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 248; Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Isaac N. Arnold 
(May 25, 1864), in 7 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 361; see also ROBERT S. HARPER, 
LINCOLN AND THE PRESS 257–64 (1951). 
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preservation of the Union itself.  The Republicans never were willing to 
make the issue the focal point of an up-or-down vote, and the 
implications were clear.  Americans were willing to tolerate a certain 
degree of suppression of civil liberty in a crisis as great as that of the 
Civil War, but there were limits that a brilliant politician such as Lincoln 
knew better than to test. 
Americans made much clearer determinations as to the nature of the 
Union and whether the United States would be transformed from a 
slaveholding to a free republic.  Yet even here the constitutional politics 
run against final decisions.  The United States emerged from the Civil 
War as a nation, and yet there would continue to be bitter struggles over 
national supremacy versus state rights.  The nation’s character as a free 
republic would continue to be tested by struggles over the place of 
African Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities in the 
American community.  The Supreme Court has always played an 
important role in those struggles, but despite pretensions to a unique 
constitutional authority, it has never settled them.  They remain the 
subjects of constitutional politics.  It is perhaps no wonder that 
Americans crave a tribunal that can settle these constitutional issues 
with clarity and finality.  But as Lincoln finally came to realize, we 
cannot do so and remain what we have become: a constitutional 
democracy. 
